Ontological Investigations

The fundamental problem with ontological discourse is that it purports to be a science of "Being as such" rather than a science of beings. The former, then, is properly a metaphysical conceit; the latter, the sciences of nature.

Everyone who ventures into this area becomes mired in broad generalizations that quickly lose their cogency. A theory of "every thing," or what makes everything what it is, is bound to fail. And yet, it stands to reason that, if we can speak of things as "being," we should be able to articulate what it is about such things that warrant the predicate.

Consequently, some of the most impressive minds that humanity has ever produced have been lured into the trap of ontological discourse--only to find themselves stuck like Br'er Rabbit in the arms of the Tar Baby. Paradoxically, it seems that not everything that "stands to reason" can be rationally articulated.

In the 19th century, a group of Russian thinkers (known collectively as Slavophiles because of their distinctive theories about Russian history and culture and what they believed to be Russia's unique world-historical "destiny" as an arbiter between Europe and Asia) developed interesting approaches to the science of ontology. Unlike what was on offer in Europe at the time, Slavophile approaches to ontology were "anti-rationalistic, anti-positivistic, and anti-materialistic" Russian Philosophy, vol. 1, edited by James M. Edie, James P. Scanlon, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin; with the collaboration of George L. Kline, Chicago: Quadrangle Books (1965), 161. While he remained aloof from Slavophile circles, Lev Tolstoy's writings evidence the influence of their ideas upon him. Feodor Dostoyevsky, on the other hand, would appear to have become, over time, an unapologetically convinced Slavophile. The importance for Slavophile thought of German Romanticism and Idealism can hardly be overestimated.

"The most unifying and best known theme of this philosophy ... was explicitly formulated by [Alexis Khomyakov (1804-1860)] under the term sobornost ... [or] an organic conception of ecclesiastical consciousness ... [that] defined the Church not as a center of teaching or authority but as a 'congregation of lovers in Christ'" [ibid., 161].

This meant that Christians are united to one another "'organically' rather than 'organizationally.' The Church is not an authority which can force obedience but a free union of believers who love one another. The only source of faith (the highest and truest kind of knowledge) is the consciousness of believers in their collectivity. No Council or Church pronouncement [is binding] unless it is ratified by the community of believers" [ibid., 161-162]--a view that bears striking resemblance to the Sunni concepts of iman, umma, and 'ijma (and which may owe something to them).

While the Slavophiles clearly developed their ideas in an ecclesiocentric fashion, their conceptual apparatus has wider application. Epistemologically, "like the German Romantics, the Slavophiles do not emphasize the clear and distinct ideas of abstract thought but that realm of interior, pre-conscious, instinctual access to truth called 'intuition' or, in religious experience, 'faith.' This is not faith in the sense of belief in clearly defined dogmas or propositions, but a kind of knowledge which precedes any abstract thought or 'reason'" [ibid]. The Slavophiles were convinced that Western Christianity had "lost this kind of 'faith'" and, consequently, had "developed a 'rationalistic' and 'juridical' view of Christian truth and thus cut itself off from the living source of religion. [Therefore, they asserted that] knowledge (in the highest sense) and the possession of truth are not a function of individual consciousness but are entrusted only to the collectivity. [The historian of Russian philosophy V.V. Zenkovsky named the Slavophile] theory of knowledge ontologism. As opposed to Western rationalism, ontologism considers 'rational' cognition to be a secondary and derived form of knowledge, based on and flowing from a more fundamental, more primitive contact with reality which is pre-cognitive. [The ontological implication of this theory of knowledge resides in the notion of an] 'organic togetherness in cognition' which characterizes the solidarity of true Christian believers, particularly within Orthodoxy. As long as a man is vitally inserted in this sobornost, he is in the truth ... whenever, through pride, he attempts to discover the truth by relying on his own powers of reason, in isolation from the collectivity, he falls into error" [ibid].

Anyone familiar with the "ontological prerequisites" for Leo Tolstoy's "world outlook" will find much that is familiar here [see A History of Russian Philosophy, vol. 2, edited by Valery A. Kuvakin, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books (1994), 384-393]. Richard Gustafson's Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1986), details Tolstoy's numerous debts to Eastern Christian thought.

Tolstoy appropriated much that he found attractive in Slavophile and Orthodox philosophy and cut it loose from its moorings in Russian parochialism and, thereby, exploited its universal (i.e., broadly humanistic) potential and appeal. In his hands, the "science" of ontology abandons the ambition to become a "theory of everything" or a theory of what makes everything what it is. Instead, Tolstoyan ontology is not a "science" but, rather, a rhetorical mode. It is an assertion that human beings share a common life and a common destiny (i.e., death). The implications of this assertion are, for Tolstoy, not so much epistemological as they are ethical. We are all in this together, would seem to be his "ontological" conclusion; therefore, it would behoove us to begin to order our lives in such a way that both acknowledges and does honor to our common fate.

The Tolstoyan ethic moves from this rhetorical "ontology" to a "deontological" morality, i.e., one that assents to the proposition that general and specific obligations are owed to others. It is, at its base, a sense of noblesse oblige. Such nobility, however, is not a matter of privileged birth but of common birth (i.e., every human being enters this world via natality). The Tolstoyan ethic is aristocratic in this limited sense and, in the event, mirrors the Qur'anic notion that every human being is both a khalifa and an 'abd, i.e., born to lead through service. For Tolstoy (as in the Qur'an), the "best" among us must truly be the best among us (see Qur'an 49:13).